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This paper re-examines the ‘good policy environment’ argument for aid effectiveness and 
allocation in Africa. It does so while controlling for the role of social cohesion and its 
interplay with aid. The empirical results indicate that once we account for the role of 
social cohesion the impact of policy disappears. This casts doubt on the conclusions in 
Burnside and Dollar (2000) and the policy lessons derived from their  findings. Our 
results have important policy implications as they suggest that conditioning aid allocation 
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1.  Introduction  
 
In 1997, Craig Burnside and David Dollar published a  World Bank Policy Research 
Working Paper titled “Aid, Policies, and Growth.” The paper was subsequently published 
in the American Economic Review in 2000 and has become since the late 1990s an 
influential contribution to the debate on aid effectiveness. The main findings of the paper 
are that the positive impact of aid on economic growth depends on the presence of good 
policies (good fiscal, monetary, and trade policies). Since then, several empirical studies 
(see for example, Hansen and Tarp, 2000; Easterly et al., 2004; Baliamoune-Lutz, 2006; 
and Baliamoune-Lutz and Mavrotas, 2009) have shown that the effect of policy is not 
robust.  
 
The findings in Burnside and Dollar (2000) have some important policy implications with 
regards to aid allocation and conditionality. If aid is to be conditional on good policies, 
one should ensure that the policy effect is significant and robust. If good policies do 
indeed influence aid effectiveness and donors link aid to good policy then countries with 
good policies will receive more aid and grow faster (aid effectiveness). If on the other 
hand, good policies are not what matters the most to making aid effective, then countries 
with a good policy environment may receive more aid (rewarded by donors) but may still 
show low (or negative) growth rates.  
 
The present paper re-examines the ‘good policy environment’ argument by using the 
Burnside-Dollar (henceforth BD) methodology and expanding the panel data on Africa 
slightly (using the dataset in Easterly at al., 2004). The study, however, is different from 
both Burnside and Dollar (2000) and Easterly et al. (2004) in that it focuses exclusively 
on African countries and controls for the effect of social cohesion on aid effectiveness. 
Our empirical results indicate that once we account for the role of social cohesion the 
impact of policies disappears. This casts doubt on the conclusions in Burnside and Dollar 
(2000) and the policy lessons derived from their findings. Our results have important 
policy implications as they indicate that conditioning aid allocation on ‘good policy 
environment’ may not necessarily lead to higher aid effectiveness. The empirical results   3 
in the present paper suggest that countries with strong social cohesion may actually make 
good use of aid, while aid in countries with weak social cohesion may be ineffective, 
independently of the policy environment. However, our results also show that policy 
(policy reform) has direct positive effects on growth, independently of the level of aid.  
 
The topic of aid effectiveness is of particular relevance to Africa due to the heavy 
dependence of many African countries on aid and concessional loans. Approximately half 
of the total number of the International Development Association (IDA) borrowing 
(eligible) countries is in Africa (about 40 countries). Many sub-Saharan African (SSA) 
countries have been in the fragile states group and the Low-Income Country Under Stress 
(LICUS) group. In addition, IDA aid allocation is to a large extent function of the 
Country Policies and Institutional Performance Assessment (CPIA) index, which is based 
in part on economic policy indicators.
1 Similarly, the roles of policy reform and social 
cohesion are of special importance to Africa, as most countries have undertaken or are 
undertaking policy reforms and many African countries are characterized by weak social 
cohesion, often caused by high ethnic fractionalization.2 
 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a brief review of 
the literature on aid effectiveness. Section 3, describes the data and methodology. Section 
4 discusses the estimation results. Section 5 includes summary and further discussion. 
 
2.  Aid effectiveness: A brief review of the literature 
 
There exists an important body of empirical literature on the aid-growth nexus as well as 
some interesting reviews of the literature on this topic, including Mosley (1987), White 
(1992), Cassen (1994), Burnside and Dollar (2000), Tarp (2000) Hansen and Tarp (2000, 
2001), Lensink and White (2001), Dalgaard and Hansen (2001), Dalgaard et al. (2004), 
McGillivray (2003), Easterly et al. (2004), Addison et al. (2005), McGillivray et al. 
(2005), Rajan and Subramanian (2005), Antipin and Mavrotas (2006), Baliamoune-Lutz 
(2006), B ourguignon and Sundberg (2007),  Lahiri (2007), and  Riddell (2007). The 
                                                  
1 See the study by Baliamoune-Lutz (2008). 
2 See Baliamoune-Lutz (2009).   4 
findings in the empirical literature range from ‘aid h aving no effect at all’, or even 
‘having negative effects’ on growth, to ‘aid having strong positive effects’ on growth. 
Within this range we find different types of conditional effectiveness.  
 
The body of research that has argued that aid does not spur growth (or may even have 
negative effects) includes for example, White (1992), Boone (1994, 1996), Lal (1996, 
2005), Martens et al. (2002), Easterly (2003),  Rajan and Subramanian (2005),  and 
Djankov et al. (2006).  For example, Djankov et al. (2006) argue that “foreign aid has a 
negative impact on the democratic stance of developing countries, and on economic 
growth by reducing investment and increasing government corruption”.  
 
Most studies that have argued in favor of conditional effectiveness cite ‘good policy 
environment’ as a crucial factor. Two notable exceptions
3 are Dalgaard et al. (2004) and 
Baliamoune-Lutz and Mavrotas (2009). Dalgaard et al. focus on climate-related factors 
and show that aid is effective in enhancing growth, but the impact is smaller in countries 
with larger fraction of land in the tropics. On the other hand, Baliamoune-Lutz and 
Mavrotas find that social cohesion has a more robust impact on the effectiveness of aid 
while the effect of policy was insignificant.  
 
 In reaction to the  finding in Burnside and Dollar (2000) study that ‘aid is effective in 
countries with good policy environment’, several scholars have re-examined the 
robustness of the policy effect. For example, Hansen and Tarp (2000) show that aid has a 
positive and significant effect on growth even in countries that do not have good policy 
environment. Antipin and Mavrotas (2006) conclude that “the marginal effect of the 
disputed (Aid/GDP) x Policy variable on real per capita GDP growth is substantially 
smaller than in Burnside and Dollar, thus casting serious doubts on the robustness of their 
findings, and most importantly, on the validity of the policy lessons emerging from the 
                                                  
3 In addition, Hansen and Tarp (2001) and Lensink and White (2001) tested the hypothesis that aid may 
have diminishing returns. Both studies find empirical evidence of decreasing returns to aid. 
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BD study.” Dalgaard and Hansen (2001) claim that “if anything, good policy is likely to 
reduce the growth effects of aid because they act as substitutes in the growth process.”  
Easterly et al. (2004) use the BD data, and extend the period covered to 1997 (Burnside 
and Dollar used data for 1970-93) and add data that has become available since the late 
1990s. Using this modified set of data, the authors show that the policy-aid interaction 
does not have any effect on growth. They conclude, “…adding additional data to the BD 
study of aid effectiveness raises new doubts about the effectiveness of aid and suggests 
that economists and policymakers should be less sanguine about concluding that foreign 
aid will boost growth in countries with good policies” (Easterly et al. 2004, pp. 779-89).   
 
Similarly, Baliamoune-Lutz and Mavrotas (2009) use both the original BD dataset and 
the Easterly et al. dataset, and focus on the interaction between social capital (social 
cohesion) and aid. The authors find that social cohesion has an important and robust 
impact on aid effectiveness while the aid-policy interaction was statistically insignificant. 
Baliamoune-Lutz and Mavrotas (2006, pp. 511-12) write that “[i]t is rather surprising that 
while many agree that socio-cultural factors may affect the effectiveness of aid and may 
in turn be affected by aid, there is not a single empirical study that has explored the effect 
of social capital on aid effectiveness at the macro level…The use of aid for the ‘purpose 
it is meant for’ implies a relationship of trust. Such trust may, to a large extent, depend on 
the level of social capital.” 
 
3.  Data and methodology 
 
We use the dataset in Easterly et al. (2004)
4 who use the dataset from the Burnside and 
Dollar (2000) study and also develop a modified dataset where they add some new 
observations to the BD dataset as well as make some revisions to the data. The dependent 
variable is the rate of growth in GDP per capita. The main right-hand side (RHS) 
variables include (1) aid, defined as the ratio of Development Assistance to real GDP, 
from  Chang et al., 1998; IMF 2002; and DAC 2002); (2) a policy index, which is a 
regression-weighted average of macroeconomic policies (see Burnside and Dollar, 2000); 
                                                  
4 Easterly et al. (2003) provide a detailed description of the data.   6 
(3) an indicator of financial development, defined as the ratio of M2 to GDP; (4) The 
number of assassinations per million of people; (5) an indicator of ethnic fractionalization 
from Easterly and Levine (1997); (6) an indicator of institutional quality from Knack and 
Keefer (1995);  (7) the logarithm of initial income per capita (from Summers and Heston, 
1991, updated in Easterly et al. 2004) ; and (8) a dummy variable for sub-Saharan Africa. 
Unless noted otherwise, all data are from the World Bank World Development Indicators 
(2002). The estimations include fixed time effects to control for the effects of worldwide 
business cycles and the same  instruments in the BD study (see Burnside and Dollar, 
2000). 
 
Burnside and Dollar use a panel of 56 countries and data averages for six 4-year periods 
from 1970 to 1993. The policy variable in their model (as well as in Easterly et al., 2004; 
and in Baliamoune-Lutz, 2006) is an index composed of three polices: budget surplus, 
inflation rates, and the Sachs and Warner (1995) openness index. This policy index is 
interacted with aid and the sign and statistical significance of the coefficient on this 
interaction term is evaluated.  
 
In the present paper we use 4-year data averages from 27 African countries (including 
North Africa) for the period 1970-93 (the sample in Burnside and Dollar, 2000) and 
1970-97 (the sample in Easterly et al., 2004). Some countries are missing data for some 




4.  Estimation results 
 
Burnside and Dollar (2000) estimate several ordinary least-squares (OLS) and two-stage 
least-squares (2SLS) equations and find that the coefficient on the aid-policy interaction 
term is positive and statistically significant in four OLS and two 2SLS estimations. In the 
present paper, we focus exclusively on 2SLS estimations because aid is more likely to be 
endogenous. The estimation results are reported in Tables 1-3.  
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In Table 1 we report results from re-estimating the BD 2SLS equations for the period 
1970-93 (equations 5 and 8; 5/2SLs and 8/2SLS) where the authors find statistical 
evidence that policy has an impact on aid effectiveness. We use their dataset but we 
include only African countries. In columns (1)-(4) we include all African countries and in 
columns (5)-(8) we include only low-income countries. In columns (3), (4), (7) and (8) 
we omit outliers. In each case, we estimate the equation with and without the term ‘policy 
X aid
2’.  We find similar results to those obtained in BD. In low-income African 
countries (and excluding outliers), the variable policy has a positive effect on aid 
effectiveness; the coefficient on the interaction term between aid and policy is positive 
and statistically significant (column (7)). 
 
Next, we use the dataset from Easterly et al. (2004) and focus on the BD period of time 
(1970-93), and include the interaction between ethnic fractionalization and aid. In this 
paper, we consider ethnic fractionalization as an indicator (or a proxy) for the level of 
social cohesion.5 The results displayed in Table 2 indicate that the coefficient on this term 
is consistently negative and statistically significant, suggesting that social cohesion 
enhances aid effectiveness; or alternatively, ethnic fractionalization reduces the impact of 
aid on growth. However, the coefficient on the term ‘policy X aid’ is no longer 
significant and we find evidence that aid does have a direct positive effect on growth in 
Africa. 
 
The results in Table 3 are obtained from estimations and data similar to those underlying 
the results reported in Table 2, but here we extend the period to 1997 (so that the dataset 
covers 1970-97). The results indicate that social cohesion (ethnic fractionalization) 
influences aid effectiveness and the impact of policy on the effectiveness of aid 
disappears. In addition, we find that both aid and policy reforms (the policy variable) 
have strong direct positive effects on growth. While we find evidence of these effects in 
all countries in our sample, the effects of policy are stronger in low-income countries. 
                                                  
5 Easterly et al. (2005) use ethnolinguistic fractionalization as an indirect measure of social cohesion. 
Ethnolinguistic fractionalization is measured by the probability that two randomly selected individuals will 
not belong to the same ethnolinguistic group (see Easterly and Levine, 1997).  
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Overall, these findings are consistent with conclusions reported in other studies. Hansen 
and Tarp (2000), Dalgaard and Hansen (2001), Easterly et al. (2004), and Baliamoune-
Lutz and Mavrotas (2009) find the coefficient on the policy-aid interaction term to be 
statistically insignificant. However, Easterly et al. (2004) find that aid has no effect, 
while Hansen and Tarp (2000), Dalgaard and Hansen (2001) find statistical evidence that 
aid has a direct impact but there are diminishing returns to aid. The present study fails to 
find evidence of decreasing returns to aid but we do, however, find that aid has a direct 
positive effect on growth, once we control for the direct growth effects of the policy 
environment and social cohesion, and control for the interplay of social cohesion and aid. 
 
 
In summary, we find that a good policy environment has a direct positive impact on 
growth but does not seem to influence the effectiveness of aid. The growth-effects of aid 
in Africa appear to be significantly influenced by social cohesion (using the index of 
social fractionalization as a proxy for social cohesion). The effect of social cohesion is 
significant and robust to several changes in the specification. Thus, it appears that 
reducing the negative effects of ethnic fractionalization or improving social cohesion 
could importantly enhance aid effectiveness. 
   
5.  Summary and discussion 
 
In this paper, we study the impact of aid on African countries, using data and estimation 
techniques previously used in the empirical literature. We examine, in particular, the 
impact of policy and social cohesion on the effectiveness of aid. The empirical results 
indicate that once we account for the role of social cohesion the impact of the interplay 
between policy and aid vanishes, which casts doubt on the conclusions in Burnside and 
Dollar (2000); that aid is effective only in good-policy environments. Our results carry 
potentially important implications for policy. They suggest that conditioning aid 
allocation on ‘good policy environment’ may not necessarily result in improved aid 
effectiveness. The findings imply that countries with high levels of social cohesion may 
be more able to put aid to good use. We also find that policy has direct positive effects on   9 
growth,6 independently of the level of aid. These results imply that aid donors must try to 
find more effective ways to allocate and help manage aid in countries with weak social 
cohesion, such as targeting education and health projects and programs that would reduce 
the negative effects of ethnic fractionalization (social fragmentation) and/or projects that 
are not sensitive to these effects. 
 
Aid allocation tends to be based on the Country Policy and Institutional Assessment 
(CPIA) ratings.7 The CPIA index  tries to account for some factors that may have a 
positive effect on social cohesion by including an indicator of social inclusion/exclusion 
in the cluster for ‘policies for social inclusion/equity’. The results derived in this paper 
imply that perhaps a more elaborate measure of social cohesion should be included in this 
cluster and should be assigned a significant weight. Furthermore, the results we obtain in 
this paper indicate that while policy reform has a significant impact on growth it does not 
directly influence the effectiveness of aid in Africa. Kanbur (2000) stresses the fact that 
African countries suffer from aid dependence, which he explains as African policymakers 
spending valuable time trying to comply with reporting procedures and negotiations with 
donors. 
 
Kanbur (2000) cites Wuyts (1996) who reports that for “Mozambique, where there are 
405 projects in the Ministry of Health alone and administrative costs run to 30 to 40% of 
project funds. Separate reporting requirements for each donor, and separate links between 
parts of different aid agencies and their counterparts in the various Ministries, mean that 
much of time, energy and political capital is spent in gaming with external actors” (as 
cited in Kanbur, 2000).  It is quite reasonable to expect the time and resources devoted to 
negotiating with donors to be higher the worse the policy outcome. Furthermore, as 
argued by Adedeji (1995), Africa’s independent policymaking and economic 
management have been reduced and ‘narrowed’ as a result of trying to obtain the 
                                                  
6 It is important to note that the effectiveness of policy reforms can also be influenced by institutional 
quality; see Addison and Baliamoune-Lutz (2006) on empirical evidence of the significance of this 
interplay in the Maghreb countries. 
7 We should point out that aid donors and aid agencies do not necessarily apply the policy-aid 
conditionality in a strict manner; see Kanbur (2000), Nunnenkamp and Thiele (2006), and Baliamoune-
Lutz and McGillivray (2008).   10 
‘certificate of good behavior’ from international financial institutions and aid donors. 
What this  suggests is that basing aid allocation on policy may in fact lead to more 
inefficiencies and waste of resources than would otherwise take place and could diminish 
the ability of policymakers to enact policies that could have stronger positive effects on 
aid effectiveness and growth, such as those that would improve social cohesion. 
Similarly, not allocating aid to a country that has strong social cohesion but weak policy 
environment (for e.g., based on inflation or the state of its budget surplus) would alter 
(reduce) the prospects of growth in two ways. First, the country receives less aid and 
hence is deprived of an additional source of growth since we showed that aid has a direct 
positive effect on growth in Africa. Second, since the country has strong social cohesion, 
it may actually get additional benefits from aid through its efficient use (the interplay 
between social cohesion and aid). Baliamoune-Lutz (2008) uses Arellano-Bond GMM 
estimations on African data and focuses in particular on the effect policy reform and 
institutions have on growth and the implications for aid conditionality in fragile states. 
The author finds that social cohesion has a positive effect on economic performance in 
fragile states in Africa, while political institutions have a negative effect. She also finds 
that trade reforms (policy) have ambiguous effects. High levels of trade openness have 
negative effects but the interplay between export diversification and openness at high 
levels of openness produces a positive impact on income. Baliamoune-Lutz (2008) 
concludes that 
 
The results associated with the effects of political institutions and openness to 
trade seem to suggest the possibility of a ‘catch-22’, at least in the short run. If a 
fragile state tries to improve its political institutions or its openness to trade, and 
thus improve its CPIA, it may end up with lower per-capita income, and it would 
by definition of the formula used to allocate IDA funds get more money. 
However, while obtaining more aid may be a good outcome lower income implies 
more poverty (assuming no changes in income distribution). Thus, aid would not 
result in significant poverty reduction. (Baliamoune-Lutz, 2008, p. 13) 
 
Taking into account the impact of social cohesion on aid effectiveness may shed new 
light on the so-called micro-macro paradox (Mosley, 1987), which refers to the fact that 
micro-based studies generally find strong evidence that aid is effective while macro-type 
studies do not. Micro-based studies tend to focus on projects handled by small groups   11 
(teams) where social cohesion is often strong. Our results show that aid works better in 
countries where social cohesion is high, thus they seems to reconcile the micro and macro 
evidence. 
 
The issue of aid effectiveness is an important one. At least in the case of development 
aid, donors, policymakers and scholars should normally be interested in assessing 
whether aid leads to higher growth and whether it contributes to poverty reduction. The 
empirical literature includes contradictory findings. Many studies have argued that aid is 
ineffective. For example, Boone (1994, 1996) finds that aid did not lead to higher growth. 
Easterly (1999) draws similar conclusions, although his focus was on short-relationships 
between aid and growth. Kanbur (2000) even titled his article ‘the failure of aid’. On the 
other hand, other scholars have argued that aid is, indeed, growth enhancing. For 
example, Sachs et al (2004) contend that aid can play a vital role in helping countries to 
achieve the necessary growth to escape the poverty trap.  
 
Finally, as argued by Clemens et al. (2004), it is important to note that different types of 
aid may have different effects on growth. It may be more insightful to distinguish 
between ‘developmental aid’ and ‘geopolitical aid’.
8 However, in the case of African 
countries, and with the exception of a small number of countries (the main exception is 
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2SLS estimations, data from Burnside-Dollar sample, 1970-93 




  5/2SLS (low and middle-
income, outliers included) 
5/2SLS (low and middle-
income, outliers excluded) 
 8/2SLS (low-income, 
outliers included) 
8/2SLS (low income 
outliers excluded) 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 




































































































































































(Aid)2 X Policy    -0.04 
(0.05) 
  0.10 
(0.21) 
  -0.09* 
(0.05) 
  0.03 
(0.14) 
Observations  100  100  98  98  94  94  92  92 
R
2  0.24  0.30  0.32  0.30  0.29  0.30  0.36  0.36   16 
Table 2 
Data from Easterly et al. (2004), 1970-93; accounting for social cohesion 
Dependent variable: Growth rate in real GDP 
  5/2SLS (low and middle-
income, outliers included) 
5/2SLS (low and middle-
income, outliers excluded) 
 8/2SLS (low-income, 
outliers included) 
8/2SLS (low income outliers 
excluded) 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9) 






















































Eth. Fract. X  
Assassinations 
  -0.12  
(6.00) 
  -0.98 
(5.93) 
































































































Aid X Policy  -0.001 
(0.22) 
  0.39 
(0.34) 
  -0.06 
(0.20) 
  0.37 
(0.33) 
   
(Aid)2    0.19 
(0.18) 
  0.25 
(0.28) 
  0.19 
(0.19) 
  0.19 
(0.23) 
 



















2 X Eth. Fract.                  0.28 
(0.32) 
Observations  106  106  103  103  100  100  98  98  98 
R2  0.33  0.21  0.37  0.10  0.39  0.21  0.37  0.22  0.21   17 
Table 3 
ELR data and ELR sample, 1970-97; accounting for social cohesion 
Dependent variable: Growth rate in real GDP 
 
  5/2SLS (low and middle-
income, outliers included) 
5/2SLS (low and middle-
income, outliers excluded) 
 8/2SLS (low-income, 
outliers incl uded) 
8/2SLS (low income outliers 
excluded) 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
























































  -0.07 
(2.37) 






















































































Aid X Policy  -0.08 
(0.23) 




  0.07 
(0.35) 
   

















2                -3.39 
(5.99) 
Observations  128  128  124  121  121  118  118  118 
R2  0.27  0.27  0.30  0.33  0.32  0.31  0.31  0.31 